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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES**

8 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Kurdish Problem

1. In view of recent increased interest in the Kurds as a potentially troublesome element in the Middle East, O/NE on 2 April convened a meeting of Kurdish specialists from OCI, DDP, State, and the services to discuss the problem. Although no attempt was made to reach formal conclusions, there appeared to be general agreement on most key issues.

2. The principal substantive points made at the meeting are summarized below for your information:

a. There is little likelihood of the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.* Despite continuing efforts by exile groups

* The Kurds are the predominant element of the population in an area embracing southeast Turkey, northwest Iran, and northeast Iraq. Some Kurds are also found in northeast Syria and in the USSR. Although reliable population estimates are lacking, the Kurds of the area are estimated to number over 3 million, divided roughly as follows: Turkey: 1½ million; Iran: 500,000; Iraq: 800,000; Syria: 250,000; USSR: 100,000 (Soviet Armenia).

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and some of the younger urbanised elements in Iraq to stir up Kurdish nationalist feeling, the Kurds have never been politically united and they lack any real sense of nationhood. Such ethnic, linguistic, and religious cohesiveness as does distinguish them will probably continue to be outweighed by inherent inhibiting factors - narrow and often divisive tribal and sub-tribal loyalties, varying degrees of identification with the states in which they live, and widespread indifference as to who controls the political machinery so long as the individual's tribe is left alone. Over time, the Kurdish martial tradition and the cause of Kurdish separatism are likely to be further weakened by detribalisation, settlement, and related social changes.

b. Nevertheless, the Kurds will continue to have considerable nuisance value as rebels - or potential rebels - at least for some years to come. As a traditionally warlike and still largely nomadic or semi-nomadic people who occupy relatively remote areas and have a long history of bad blood with the authorities of their host countries, the Kurds could fairly readily be aroused if

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given arms and funds from outside. Even in the absence of an acknowledged over-all leader, enough tribes might be stirred up to make considerable trouble for a weak host country, especially if it had other security problems to contend with at the same time.

c. The security problem posed by the Kurds is minimal in Turkey, where the government and army have long exercised firm control and have had some success in encouraging assimilation. In Syria the relatively small Kurdish minority has been settled for years and offers little trouble to the government. It thus has little special potential as a vehicle for Iraqi subversion against the UAR.

d. However, the situation is different in Iran, where the government's policy is one of general neglect punctuated by fine promises on the one hand and efforts to repress the Kurds and put them in their place on the other. At the same time, the government in Tehran exercises only limited effective authority over its Kurdish areas. Although there is presently wide-spread acceptance of the

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status quo and even some genuine loyalty to the crown among Iranian Kurds, they might cause a serious diversion of Iranian internal security resources if sufficiently aroused.

e. Iraq is currently the most active scene of developments affecting the Kurds, who comprise some 20% of the population. The Qasim government has sought to play down traditional Arab-Kurdish animosities by well-publicized appointments of Kurds to high government posts, by welcoming the return of Mulla Mustapha and his followers from exile in the USSR*, by proclaiming Iraq a republic of Arabs and Kurds, and by broadcasting extensively in Kurdish. Especially if the Communists continue their effective drive toward power in Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds will give them a significant weapon against Iran. At the same time, however, Kurdish-Arab animosities will continue to present problems of control to any Iraqi government.

f. The USSR has maintained its agitation and propaganda among the Kurds at a relatively low key. It was felt that

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the USSR, while not neglecting to build up its assets among the Kurds, would view them primarily as a means of harassing and undermining Iran, probably in conjunction with or following other moves to create trouble for the Shah. In any event, the USSR would probably not want to exploit the Kurds in any manner inconsistent with its efforts first to secure control of Iraq. When and if the Soviets should decide to make use of the Kurds, whether to establish a "land bridge" across Iran or more generally to create disturbances within that country, it would probably be done primarily through the Kurds of Iraq rather than directly from the USSR.

g. It was generally agreed that Turkey and Iran would be unwilling to use Kurdish nationalism as a weapon against the Arabs for fear of stirring up trouble at home and that Nasser's identification with Arab nationalism would make it extremely difficult for him to woo the Iraqi Kurds.

3. We do not believe, on the basis of our discussion, that there is need for a formal estimate on the Kurds at this time. However, there was general agreement that the Kurdish problem would receive continuing close scrutiny by all agencies represented at the meeting, with particular emphasis on getting fuller reporting on conditions and attitudes.

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SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
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